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24 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

judges, both in the State and Federal Courts, have caused
much comment among members of the Bar by reason of the wholly
unwarranted and unjudicial attitude assumed by these judges toward
lawyers trying cases before them." Under the cloak of their privilege, the report continues, "they indulge in fits of temper and
malicious attempts to humiliate attorneys before their clients."
There is no way through which such abuses can be restrained, excepting that which the committee employs. It frankly places the
facts before the tribunal of public opinion. Publicity is the bar's recourse. In resorting to it the committee has introduced a novel and
effective method to check unjudicial conduct on the part of judges.
The remarks by Judge At-well were ill-chosen and abusive. They
were particularly out of place in this case since they were made after
the trial had been concluded and the verdict rendered. Such conduct deserves criticism. The committee has handled the case well.
Its report is noteworthy for the courage it exhibits and the example
it sets.
ALBERT

J. HARNO.

LEGAL ETHICS IN ACTION

I
Some lawyers, particularly those who assume to be the most
virile members of the profession, have adopted an attitude of scorn
with reference to legal ethics unless there is involved a violation
of the criminal code. Several recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court and other courts should make it clear that the subject is not one merely academic in its nature. It also appears to
be clear that our Supreme Court under the leadership of Mr. Chief
Justice Taft is standing for the very highest standards of professional integrity. It is believed that no profession can be worthy of
that name unless it has a code of ethics more refined than that which
actuates the conduct of the average person in the community at
large. Juries, absent well organized systems to control them as in
English and federal courts, in the long run may be taken to represent average standards. Their conclusions are frequently shocking
to members of the legal profession. However much courts may err
it is hardly to be denied that they rise above the standards of the
jury. Upon the general subject there is a very scholarly and noteworthy opinion by Cardozo, C. J., in People ex rel. v. Culkin 248 N.
Y. 465.

EDITORIALS

In 1922 the United States Supreme Court in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U. S. 101, reviewed the action of the district
court of the southern district of New York which had awarded to
Abraham S. Gilbert, a member of the New York bar, the sum of
$118,000 for services rendered by him as master in eight causes
which occupied 282 days of his time. The Supreme Court admitted
that compensation for a master should be liberal and, generally,
that greater compensation should be allowed a master than that
paid to judicial officers. In the particular instance the allowance
was considered grossly excessive and the compensation was reduced
to $49,250.
On November 21, 1927, as reported in 275 U. S. 499, an order
was addressed to Mr. Gilbert requiring him to make written report
to the Supreme Court of the fees which had been paid to him for
his services as master, and whether he had returned any portion of
such fees. In the event that he had not repaid the excess, he was
required to show cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise
dealt with.
Mr. Gilbert made his report on January 16, 1928. It then
appeared (276 U. S. 6) that he had received from several gas companies, which were involved in the litigation in which he acted as
master, the total sum of $118,000. This sum apparently was paid
shortly after the fees were allowed by the district court. He never
returned any of the sum allowed and he justified his conduct by
stating that no one of the gas companies had ever questioned the
amount or asked for a return of any portion thereof. It also appeared that in December, 1923, he had brought an action in the
supreme court of New York and had obtained a declaratory judgment that the Consolidated Gas Company (one of the companies
involved in the litigation) had no valid claim against him for the
return of any part of the $57,500 which it had paid.
The Supreme Court of the United States disapproved very
strongly of Mr. Gilbert's conduct and stated that it was his imperative duty immediately to return the excess together with six per
cent interest from May 15, 1922, the date of the announcement of
the previous opinion. The court also stated that Gilbert's conduct
was not "upright and according to law" within the fair intendment
of the oath which he took at the time he became a member of the
bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.
On February 20, 1928, Mr. Gilbert presented himself before
the Supreme Court and demonstrated that he had returned the excess, together with interest for a period of over five years, the total
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sum returned being $92,744.32. Also, he had paid income taxes
for one year on the sum of $118,000, the sum allowed by the district court. The Supreme Court then determined that Mr. Gilbert
had not sufficiently purged himself and again condemned his conduct. Accordingly he was suspended from his rights and privileges
as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court for six months and
he was taxed with the costs of the proceeding. The essence of Mr.
Gilbert's offense according to the court was that he relied upon the
tolerance of the litigant companies which were successful in the
litigation and therefore apparently well satisfied not to move for a
compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court which ordered
a reduction in the fees that had been allowed. In its opinion (276
U. S. 294) the court also stated: "We were desirous of making it
clear by our action that the judges of the courts, in fixing allowances
for services to court officers, should be most careful, and that vicarious generosity in such a matter could receive no countenance."
It is not believed that it is stating the situation too strongly
to affirm that allowances made to masters, referees, and similar
officials frequently have been excessive and perhaps some of them
have been scandalous. The Supreme Court of the United States is
to be congratulated for having set forth a new point of view. It
has had and will continue to have its effect. Avariciousness is not
one of the ideals of the profession.
In First Trust and Savings Bank v. St. Louis Coke and Iron
Co., 29 Fed. (2d) 506, decided November 28, 1928, the circuit
court of appeals for the seventh circuit considered an allowance
which had been made to a master by the district court for the
southern division of the southern district of Illinois. The master's
services extended over a period of a little less than two years. He
had given services for sixty full days and on fifty-four additional
days he had been employed a part of the time each day in the particular litigation. For this he was allowed a fee of $16,500. The
circuit court of appeals, citing the Gilbert case, stated that "we cannot be generous with other people's money." Accordingly, the allowance was reduced to the "liberal" sum of $7,500.
II
During the October term of 1927, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36. This
case concerned the tangled affairs of the Daniel Boone Woolen
Mills Corporation, which had its main business in Illinois.
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In the city of Chicago on the 14th of February, 1925, Harry
Horwitz, a stockholder, filed a bill on behalf of himself and other
stockholders in the superior court of Cook County. The bill in effect asked for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of
the property of the woolen mills. Application for receivership was
set for February 16th. At that time a Mr. Cowan, associated with
the law firm of Barrett & Barrett of Chicago, appeared for the
woolen mills corporation and asked for a continuance. He stated
in court that the rights of the complainant would not be affected
in any way by the continuance. Mr. Gesas appearing for the complainant agreed to the continuance with that understanding. Accordingly, the superior court continued the matter until the following Saturday morning, February 21st.
After securing this delay Mr. Cowan had a conference with
those in control of the woolen mills at the time. With a view of
arranging for a receivership in the federal court in preference to a
receivership in the state court, another stockholder, Mr. Grand, who
lived in St. Louis, was summoned to a conference with Mr. Cowan
at the latter's request. Mr. Grand suggested that a law firm of
which Messrs. Stern and Johnson were members should be selected
to represent those in control of the company. It was decided to
file a creditors' bill. The list of creditors of the company was examined and one Philipson, the agent of a creditor, was selected,
partially because he was a personal friend of Mr. Stern. Philipson
was induced to secure the consent of his company to the proposition of turning its claim over to Mr. Stern. Thus it was that those
in control of the company were able to appear before the federal
district court in Chicago on the 19th of February and ask for a
receiver. The woolen mills entered its appearance, filed its answer
admitting the averments of the bill, and consented to the appointment of a receiver. The district court appointed Edward J. Brundage to that position.
Despite this piece of sharp practice by Mr. Cowan, the superior
court of Cook county proceeded on the theory that it had jurisdiction of the matter and in the course of time entered an order appointing the Union Bank and Harkin as receivers. On March 13th
the latter filed a motion in the federal district court charging that
the district court was without jurisdiction and prayed for an order
upon Brundage to turn over the property to them. The district
court refused to do this and held that it had jurisdiction. The
matter was appealed to the circuit court of appeals which reluctantly affirmed the decree (13 F. [2d] 617). However, that court
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through Judge Evan A. Evans condemned the conduct of Mr.
Cowan in no uncertain language. The court stated:
"It is happily not a frequent occurrence that an attorney for a
debtor seeks the creditor and urges him to bring suit against his client,
or turns over his client's list of creditors to an attorney soliciting business, to say nothing of the violated pledge to the judge and opposing
counsel. Moreover, good faith required this counsel to have advised
the federal district court of the pendency of the state court proceedings."
The court also said "that the code of professional ethics was entirely ignored and forgotten" and condemned the institution of
"friendly receiverships."
The United States Supreme Court, in the opinion above referred to, reversed the decrees of the circuit court of appeals and
of the district court. However, the court did not disagree with the
lower courts in holding that there was no conflict of jurisdiction between the state court and the federal court. It differed "radically"
from the trial court as to the effect of the conduct of Mr. Cowan.
It found a way to vindicate the good faith that was due to the
state court and refused to accede to the suggestion of the district court that the limit of judicial action was for the state court
to proceed for contempt against the lawyer who did not keep faith
with it.
After condemning in very positive terms unseemly rivalry between courts in the appointment of receivers and the desire to control the patronage resulting therefrom, it held that the district court
had been a victim of a fraud. After becoming aware of this situation the district court should have denied those who were guilty of
fraud further use of its jurisdiction until the state court had an
opportunity to determine the matter to its own satisfaction.
By the time the case had got to the Supreme Court of the
United States the federal district court and its receiver had at
least partially administered upon the property and had issued receiver's certificates. Despite this embarrassment the Supreme Court
ordered the district court to surrender the property to the state
court receivers upon conditions that would protect the certificates.
Then the Supreme Court added this significant paragraph: "The
federal court should, before surrender, fix and pay the compensation due to its officers for the work done by them and, in doing so,
should take care to fix the compensation within limits which are
plainly reasonable." The implications of this remark seem obvious.
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III
Abuses in receiverships are not infrequently discussed and
admitted. Abuses in bankruptcy practice have been thought in
some instances to have become a very serious problem. The United
States Supreme Court, since Mr. Chief Justice Taft was appointed,
has attempted to remedy the condition by certain rules of court.
Before these changes were made, Mr. Samuel tUntermyer of New
York was employed by nearly all of the creditors of one Thompson. A receivership was secured but this action was set aside by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Thereafter Untermyer retained the law firm of Weil & Thorpe of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
to institute bankruptcy proceedings against Thompson. It was
agreed that for their services in this matter Weil & Thorpe should
receive $5,000.
In due course trustees were chosen and without any special
authorization Weil & Thorpe were selected as counsel for the
trustees despite a rule of the district court of the western district
of Pennsylvania which provided: "Unless specially authorized
by the court . .
trustees in bankruptcy shall not retain as
their attorney, the attorney of the . . . petitioning creditors,
of the person applying for the appointment of a receiver, or of any
creditor.
The estate of Thompson was a very large one. The administration of it extended over a considerable period of time and
allowances were made from time to time to the attorneys for the
trustees. In this way Weil & Thorpe were paid the total sum
of $144,059 by the latter part of the year 1920.
Before all of this work had been accomplished and the fees
had been paid, it was realized that $5,000 would not be adequate
compensation for Mr. Weil. So Mr. Untermyer made an agreement with Mr. Weil that he would supervise the administration
of the estate and Weil & Thorpe would continue their services with
the understanding that at the proper time Untermyer would determine what was fair compensation for Weil & Thorpe. The
latter agreed to accept Mr. Untermyer's determination and pay
over the balance of the fees to Untermyer, who apparently was
acting as a member of the firm of Guggenheim, Untermyer &
Marshall. Mr. Weil denied that such an agreement was made,
but the referee found this question of fact in favor of Mr. Untermyer.
.
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On November 15, 1920, Untermyer determined that Weil &
Thorpe should have sixty per cent of the fees and that he,
Untermyer, should have forty per cent. Weil & Thorpe were
notified of this decision but refused to pay any of the fees over to
Mr. Untermyer. Accordingly, Mr. Untermyer sued for his part
of the fees, assigning his claim to one Neary. The district court
entered a judgment for Neary in the sum of $57,064, with interest
from November 15, 1920. This judgment was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals for the second circuit in an opinion written
by Manton, J., and concurred in by Swan and Learned Hand, JJ.

(22 F. [2d] 893).
The Supreme Court of the United States through Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, in Weil v. Neary, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144, reversed the
judgment. The court concluded that the contract set up by Untermyer "is in violation of public policy and professional ethics." It
also stated: "Such a transaction between counsel calls for judicial
condemnation." The court condemned the arrangement for three
reasons. (1) It violated the rule of the district court. (2) The
provision that Untermyer was to supervise and direct Weil in the
rendition of his services was said to be in direct conflict with the
professional and official duty of Weil as an officer of the bankruptcy
court and as counsel for the trustees. (3) The provision in the contract by which Untermyer was to determine h6w the fees were to
be divided was improper as an arrangement that would have an
improper tendency to increase fees beyond the proper amount and
would also take from the court the judicial function of determining how much an officer of the court is to be paid for services
rendered.
An interesting feature of the case was that Mr. Weil appeared
before the Supreme Court and announced that he would be content
with any disposition the court desired to make of the sum in dispute provided it was not appropriated to the satisfaction of the
contract in question, the making of which he denied. The Supreme
Court not having the bankruptcy litigation before it did not feel
authorized to make any disposition of the sum but did reverse the
judgment and order a dismissal of the suit "leaving Weil to take
such steps as may be appropriate to enable the bankruptcy court
to pass the funds in controversy to the creditors."
This legal spanking, administered to one of the best known
of New York lawyers, has a significance that it is difficult to overestimate. It would be difficult for even a cynically minded person to find any thing wrong with the even handed justice admin-
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istered by the present occupants of the United States Supreme
Court. Legal ethics are not made to suit the convenience of the
most influential members of the bar.
IV
It seems to be difficult for some attorneys to recognize that
they owe a professional duty to appellate courts not to harass them
with frivolous litigation. In Slaker v. O'Connor, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep.
158, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit was dismissed because
the appellant had obtained the appeal without any authority of
law. "Thereby," said the court, "he has needlessly consumed our
time and imposed serious delay upon the appellees and otherwise
burdened them." Accordingly damages of $150 payable to the
appellees, together with the costs, were taxed against the appellant.
In Roe v. State of Kansas, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, the court
decided that there was no substance in a writ of error which was
dismissed and a penalty of $200 payable to the defendants in error
was assessed against the plaintiff in error.
A notice in a local newspaper that such and such an attorney
has reached a high stage in his professional life and has appeared
before the United States Supreme Court is perhaps a legitimate
ambition. However, it behooves all men not to be overly ambitious. It will be something of an anti-climax if a subsequent issue
of the same local paper informs its readers that the attorney has
caused his client to be assessed a penalty on account of the former's
foolish conduct in wasting the time of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In Hester v. O'Dara, 272 Pac. 1057, decided December 21,
1928, the Supreme Court of California imposed a penalty of $100
"upon the appellant for taking and prosecuting a frivolous appeal."
KENNETH C. SEARs.

